Doomsday signals for directors

These indicators of board and management concern should be on your radar — potential dire consequences may lie ahead.

BY ALLAN GRAFMAN AND ANDREW DE CAMARA

oard service is necessarily a 'team' sport. We spend significant time with people we respect, often developing social and business relationships. Over a span of years, bonds of friendship develop. These bonds of friendship and respect can be the glue that keeps a board and company moving forward.

Conversely, these bonds can lead to a mentality that overpowers a director's own good judgment, inhibiting direct action. The result: a director avoiding awkward conversations that need to take place.

When do numerous smaller concerns tip the scale toward initiating a conversation not warmly

welcomed by esteemed colleagues? Ask yourself that question as you consider how many of the following "doomsday signals" your company is sending to you. While no single indicator is predictive or conclusive, the presence of many of these signals — our focus is on board governance and director-level issues — is indicative of problems ahead.

Signals frequently encountered (but often left unaddressed)

Put a check by the ones that are on your radar:

- ☐ Culture, ethics and integrity concerns that you would address more directly if you were CEO of the company, but do not because this is a CEO's responsibility.
- ☐ Directors who have side consulting deals with the company or with large shareholders. Conflicts are apparent, as it becomes unclear where their priority or loyalty resides.
- ☐ Family members as employees and consultants. Would a truly independent director just arriving

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on the board find this relationship overwhelmingly beneficial to the company, or questionable?	of institutional knowledge from the employee base, less patience from stakeholder constituencies, and increased public scrutiny.	
☐ Committee chairs have not rotated, leading to	Directors need to be focused on the following	
ossified and entrenched positions, approaches and	signs of dysfunction among the board or they	
opinions. The same concern arises when boards	are likely to face an inability or unwillingness of	
have not embraced new members in a long time,	management to effectuate proper change, with un-	
or lack diversity in viewpoints and relevant expe-	fortunate consequences. Key ex-	
rience. [Ed. Note: Additional guidance on avoid-		
ing board entrenchment can be found in Allan	amples of more	WHAT HAT IS A DIRECTOR
Grafman's article, "The Board's 'Seven Year Itch': It	urgent dooms-	WEARING WHEN THEY SPEAK
Would Benefit All To Have Directors Take a One-	day signals:	WEARING WHEN THEY SPEAK
Year Sabbatical," DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Fourth		OR VOTE IN A MEETING?
Quarter 2014.]	☐ Management	
No succession in the fact the CEO on succession	continually miss- es performance targets and demonstrates no ability	
☐ No successor is in place for the CEO, or even an	to accurately project future performance — most	
agreed-upon succession plan process. ☐ Combined CEO/chairman roles. It is challenging	damaging when related to revenue projections and	
	cash availability. Management compounds this	
for every individual to put their role as an execu-	issue by not being intellectually honest enough to	
tive ahead of their personal interests. Allowing a	explain the poor performance.	
CEO to occupy both roles increases that challenge,		
and makes it harder and less likely for a director to	☐ Management develops a counterproductive	
challenge a sitting CEO/chairman. No surprise that	relationship with the company's lenders through its	
the bank with a combined CEO/chairman tops the	inability or unwillingness to provide data analysis	
banking industry leaderboard with \$35 billion in	that will help demonstrate to the lender that their	
fines and penalties.	interests are being considered in the decision-	
	making process.	
☐ Directors authorize bonuses as the company loses	☐ In board meetings, the CEO and/or CFO are un-	
money, and fail to address spiraling costs that grew		
during the good years.	able to answer basic and critical financial questions	
☐ <i>Investments in 'outlier' sectors</i> that have little	regarding cash position, receivables, deferred revenues, head count, contingent liabilities, and alter-	
or no relationship to current operations or talent	native courses of action.	
roster.	native courses of acti	on.
Toster.	☐ The CEO blocks or	attempts to control the abil-
☐ Repeated security 'glitches' that have been left un-	ity of directors to interact separately and inde-	
attended. Directors have been found liable for just	pendently with the CFO and other key executives.	
such inaction over a period of time.	,	•
-	☐ The CEO "springs"	" important issues or decisions
☐ Evergreen employment contracts that 'auto		ngs without placement on an
renew.' Do these allow the board to 'get by' with less	agenda, limiting the ability to assess alternatives or	
robust performance reviews and considerations of	appropriately analyze an issue.	
new leadership?	□ + " 1. (.1. GE	
7471	•	O" arises whereby the CEO
When times are good, directors may accept or	hires or trains the other key executives to mimic	
ignore the above warning signs. Directors who are seeing many of the above indicators should be	his talking points, which dissuades honest discussion of alternatives.	
prepared for their company and board to enter the		
world of distressed.	☐ Directors wearing	g multiple hats. In a venture
		acked company, what hat is
Directors in distress	a director wearing when they speak or vote in	
In a distressed situation, directors and management	a meeting: 1) board member with fiduciary ob-	
are required to execute with greater precision while	ligations; 2) debt holder with senior secured or	
resources become increasingly constrained. These	subordinated secured debt; 3) shareholder trying	
constraints include less time, dwindling cash, loss	to maximize their individual holding. Certain	

directors are indemnified by their funds so they may be willing to engage in a more aggressive approach by the company, in contradistinction to

WOULD A TRULY INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR JUST ARRIVING ON THE BOARD FIND CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS QUESTIONABLE?

the independent directors who are protected only by a company's D&O insurance policy.

☐ Resistance of management to support hiring of

outside, independent legal or business professionals with expertise in specific areas. This typically demonstrates a desire to avoid third-party scrutiny which could be at odds with management's viewpoint.

☐ Excessive abstentions by a particular board member on difficult votes, or a board member

always asking to vote last or always voting with the majority or with the CEO.

☐ Board members and executives heading for the doors as company performance deteriorates.

Your takeaway

Directors represent shareholders, the company, their board, and themselves. They are in this position due to their acumen, and their experience guides them. The above list of doomsday signals is one tool that will allow a concerned director to initiate a conversation with colleagues on difficult issues before dire consequences take hold. If you found yourself checking off several of the above indicators you may wish to use this article to overcome the awkwardness and approach your colleagues today.

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The Reg Jones list of danger signals

hen he was chairman and CEO of General Electric Co., Reginald Jones was named the best CEO in the country in a poll taken by Fortune magazine. After he retired (and was succeeded by Jack Welch), he served on a number of corporate boards and made several appearances in Directors & Boards offering his guidance on enlightened governance practices. The following list comes from his article, "Things You Can't Live With As a Board Member" [Spring 1994]. He died in 2003.

Things You Can't Live With As a Board Member

- 1. A predominantly inside board.
- 2. An overly dominant CEO who rejects a participating board.
 - 3. Surprises the board should be informed before reading in the papers.
 - 4. A closed agenda for board meetings. Failure to include topics suggested by the board.

Reginald Jones

- 5. Inadequate number of board meetings.
- 6. Actions taken and announced by the CEO that are within the province of the board, but have not yet been discussed with and approved by the board.
- 7. A compensation committee that includes
- 8. Personnel appointments by the CEO that are within the province of the board but have not yet been approved by the board.
- 9. Compensation plans announced without board approval.
- 10. Failure to review with the board the performance appraisals of key executives and their participation in incentive compensation arrangements.
- 11. Inadequate involvement of the board in succession planning.
- 12. Failure to review with the board significant union negotiations.

- 13. Appointment of outside auditors without the approval of the board.
- 14. Interference with the board's independent discussions with outside auditors.
- 15. Inadequate management responses to outside auditor criticisms.
- 16. Adoption of operating and capital budgets without board approval.
- 17. Inadequate involvement of the board in development and approval of strategic plans.
- 18. Inadequate indemnification and liability insurance coverage for directors.

Things You Can't Live Without As a **Board Member**

- 1. Reverse of items above!
- 2. A relationship among the directors that is friendly, open, mutually respectful of differing opinions and positions, and yet supportive of the CEO and devoted to the interests of the share-